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I. Land-rich economies, education 
and economic development 
Sebastian Galiani, Daniel Heymann,  
Carlos Dabús and Fernando Tohmé1 
Abstract 
We analyze the emergence of large-scale education systems in a 
framework where growth is associated with changes in the 
configuration of the economy. We model the incentives that the 
economic elite could have (collectively) to accept taxation destined to 
finance the education of credit-constrained workers. Contrary to 
previous work, in our model, this incentive does not necessarily arise 
from a complementarity between physical and human capital in 
manufacturing. Instead, we emphasize the demand for human-capital-
intensive services by high-income groups. Our model seems capable to 
account for salient features of the development of Latin America in the 
nineteenth century, where, in particular, land-rich countries such as 
Argentina established an extensive public education system and 
developed a sophisticated service sector before starting significant 
manufacturing activities. 
                                                     
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Federico Weinschelbaum, Enrique Kawamura, Pablo 
Gerchunoff, Juan Sourrouille, Luis Beccaria, Lucas Llach, Adrián Ramos, Bernardo Kosacoff, Omar Chisari, Facundo Albornoz and 
Laura Jaitman. 
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1. Introduction 
Differences in economic development have been subject to varying interpretations. A 
traditional, and still relevant literature stressed structural factors, such as the abundance of natural 
resources, the specialization in activities that offer good opportunities for technical improvements, 
the existence of high saving propensities, extensive markets or other circumstances that may 
encourage a faster pace of technological change (see, among others, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Di 
Tella and Zymmelman, 1967; Kuznets, 1965; Nurkse, 1961, Prebisch, 1951). More recently, the 
emphasis has shifted to social factors, and especially to the incentive effects of institutions and 
culture (see, among others, North, 1981; Landes, 1998; and Acemoglu et al., 2005). There is clear 
evidence that incentives (economic, social and political) and the institutions that mold them matter 
for development. However, those incentives operate in the concrete environment determined by the 
economy's configuration and experience. Institutions themselves are influenced by political and 
economic structures, that is, they are endogenously determined. Thus, a better understanding of the 
process of economic development requires considering the joint determination of economic 
structure and social institutions. 
Human capital accumulation is a clear example of this interaction between institutional and 
structural factors. In a world with imperfect capital markets, low-income workers are constrained in 
their private investment in education. Thus, the nature (and, more starkly, the presence or absence) 
of a public school system critically determines the extent and the evolution of human capital 
accumulation. Different societies develop different school systems. The social decisions on 
education are certainly influenced by broad political and ideological factors, but they also respond 
to economic considerations and, therefore, they depend on the structure of the economy. In turn, 
changes in a society's levels of schooling and literacy would affect its social structure and, perhaps, 
the political institutions that determine the educational institutions themselves. 
The United States and Canada developed schooling institutions since colonial times. By 
1850, every northern state of the United States had already enacted a law strongly encouraging or 
requiring localities to establish “free schools”, open to all children and supported by general taxes. 
The rest of the hemisphere trailed far behind those two countries in education and literacy. Even the 
most progressive Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, lagged more than fifty 
years behind the United States and Canada in providing primary schooling and attaining high levels 
of literacy. Most of Latin America was unable to achieve these standards until well into the 
twentieth century, if then (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000). 
Why did some countries invest heavily in the education of broad segments of the population 
while others lagged behind? Galor and Moav (2006) provide a very interesting explanation: 
capitalists, as a group, may have incentives to invest in the education of the labor force because the 
productivity of physical capital in manufacturing production increases with the input of human 
skills. That is, capitalists can gain from tax-financing the emergence of a public education system in 
order to raise the return on their assets by increasing the supply of a complementary factor. 
This argument seems relevant to North America (and to Western Europe; see Galor and 
Moav 2006), but it would have difficulties explaining the Latin America experience. Galor et al. 
(2005) extends the analysis in Galor and Moav (2006) by assuming that, although human skills 
contribute to increase the productivity of industrial capital, they provide no benefits for landlords as 
such. Then, if landlords have veto power over policies, they would block or delay the growth of 
public education (see also Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) for a complementary explanation). 
Certainly, this hypothesis can account for the delay of most Latin American countries, but it still 
does not rationalize the intermediate cases of the Southern Cone countries (mainly Argentina and 
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Uruguay) and Costa Rica, which started as early as the second part of the nineteenth century to 
develop important schooling systems, with a polity under the dominance of landholders. 
In this paper we present a simple model of economic development which could serve to 
analyze alternative patterns of economic evolution, and to study the emergence of public education 
systems under different economic conditions. Our main focus, however, is the appearance of public 
education in land-abundant, open economies, where policies are essentially dictated by the interests 
of landlords, and which need not engage in the production of manufactured goods, since the 
demand for these may be wholly satisfied by imports. 
The analysis assumes that the skill-intensity of output and consumption baskets increases with 
income levels, especially because the production of some services requires the input of educated 
workers. More specifically, the argument is founded on three central elements. First, individual 
preferences over consumption goods imply changes in the composition of individual spending as 
income grows, embodied in Engel curves. Second, the production of sophisticated services (which are 
non-tradeable goods, in an otherwise open economy) is intensive in human capital. Third, as in 
previous work, investment in human capital by individual households is constrained by lack of access 
to credit (see, for example, Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996). We 
also recognize that the quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes. This implies that the 
number of high-income agents may have strong effects on how many individuals are subsidized to 
accumulate human capital. Thus, the size of the elite, as the group who demands goods particularly 
intensive in human capital, may have strong effects on the size of the group of educated workers. This 
would rationalize a link between historical conditions, especially with regard to the distribution of 
land, and social choices regarding the scope and the financing of the education system. Education 
would start earlier in agricultural-based economies when land is highly productive and its property 
sufficiently distributed as to create a demand for a sizeable number of educated workers. The 
proposition corresponds with the case made by Engermann and Sokoloff (2000), who indicated that 
the greater degree of inequality in Latin America, as compared to North America, played an important 
role in explaining the different behaviors regarding the establishment of educational institutions (see 
also Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000). 
The experience of the Southern Cone of America, and particularly that of Argentina, provides 
an illustration of the argument. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Argentina became 
increasingly integrated into the international economy as a large producer and exporter of 
agricultural goods, and an importer of manufactures. At the same time, the composition of primary 
output changed significantly, as agriculture expanded over cattle rising activities, a shift that 
favored less extensive forms of production (see, among others, Adelman and Morris, 1988, Cortés 
Conde, 1966). While the distribution of land and incomes was more unequal than in North America, 
where grain production was mainly based on family farms, it was less concentrated than in other 
Latin American economies. The expansion of agricultural activities allowed a very substantial 
growth of the urban population, especially in the city of Buenos Aires, which went from less than 
100 thousand persons in 1855 to 180 thousand in 1869, and 660 thousand in 1895 (the dates 
correspond to census years). Apart from its administrative functions as the capital of the country, 
and from the growth in relatively simple manufacturing activities for the domestic market, the city 
developed an increasingly sophisticated, and large, service sector. At the same time, in the late part 
of the century, the country experienced what is widely considered one of the key processes in its 
history: the emergence of the system of public education, associated with the emblematic figure of 
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento. 
Education had motivated discussions and multiple proposals since much earlier dates. 
Sarmiento himself, already in the decade of 1840, as an exile in Chile, had studied international 
experiences and written a book on the subject, with the programmatic title “Popular Education”. For 
Sarmiento, together with many influential figures in the country, education was to be the crucial 
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instrument in the struggle between “civilization and barbarism” (the title of the best known book by 
Sarmiento); later on, the massive influx of immigration led the elite to consider education as a 
necessary tool to establish and consolidate a national identity. However, economic considerations 
were also very much part of the discussions. The National Constitution sanctioned in 1853, 
explicitly ruled on public education, giving the Provinces the responsibility for its management in 
the corresponding jurisdictions. However, the intellectual leader of the constitutional movement, 
J. B. Alberdi, clearly cautioned against too much emphasis on formal “instruction” before the 
economy had developed: “Our first publicists said: 'in which way is culture promoted in the great 
European states? Mainly through instruction: then, this must be our starting point'. They did not see 
that our nascent peoples were in a state of being made, formed, before being instructed....Regarding 
the instruction that was given to our people, it was never adequate to its needs. Copied from that 
which is received by peoples in different conditions, in our case it was always sterile and without 
profitable results. The primary education provided to our people was rather counter-productive. 
What good is for the man of the people to know how to read?...The higher instruction in our 
Republics has been no less sterile and inappropriate to our needs...Instruction, in order to be fruitful, 
must concentrate on applied sciences and arts, in practical things, on live languages, on knowledge 
of immediate and practical utility...Industry is the great instrument of moralization. By facilitating 
the means for a livelihood, it prevents crime, most of the times the product of misery and leisure...In 
vain you will fill the intelligence of youth with abstract notions...: if you leave it poor and 
unemployed...it will be dragged towards corruption through the taste for comforts that it cannot 
obtain for lack of means” (complete works, pp. 417-419, translation by the authors). 
The Argentine educational drive was noticeable, especially by Latin American standards; 
starting from quite low levels by the middle of the century, the average literacy rate in the country 
rose to 65% in 1914. However, the progress of education was not immediate, and it went along with 
the growth of the economy and, implicitly, with a growing demand for skills. In 1869, the rate of 
illiteracy was still 77% (Martínez Paz, 2003). Sarmiento was President of the country (between 
1868 and 1874), and did promote education. However, only in 1875 did the Province of Buenos 
Aires pass a comprehensive law on public instruction, while the corresponding national instrument 
was introduced in 1884. Law 1420 (which has become a cultural icon in the country) made primary 
education mandatory and gratuitous for all children between the ages of six and fourteen, instituted 
lay education, set limits on the maximum distance that a student could travel to attend school, and 
required one school for every 1,500 inhabitants in any given town. However, the large regional 
differences in rates of scholarization and literacy indicate that, directly or indirectly, spending on 
education depended very much on the economic configuration of the localities. In 1895, in the city 
of Buenos Aires, almost 60% of the children of ages 6-14 attended school, more or less double the 
national average; the rate of illiteracy in the city was 20%, against 57% in the country as a whole 
(and nearly 80% in poor jurisdictions far from the central agricultural regions, like La Rioja, 
Corrientes and Neuquén). Also, the type of education that was provided seemed to correspond more 
to the economic incentives perceived at the time than to the vision of people like Sarmiento. This 
author had written (with reference to Chile): “The State...should leave to the upper classes the 
increase in the number of physicians and lawyers according to the demand, reserving its strength 
and initiative to develop national prosperity, which those professions maintain, but do not increase. 
The country... needs thousands of geologists, chemists, botanists, physicists and mechanics; it needs 
captains, pilots, machinists for its ships; and since the upper classes will not provide that education, 
the State must supply it to whoever wishes to receive it”. Complete works, vol. XIX, p. 103 
translation of the authors). However: “the later unfolding of events disappointed the hope of 
Sarmiento, since the State...oriented its action in the traditional sense” (Tedesco, 1972), so that 
education tended to qualify individuals for work in services, rather than forming them towards 
industrial employment. 
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From a modeling point of view, we use an overlapping generations framework (similar to that 
in Galor and Moav (2006)) to represent an open economy with a particular specification of the 
commodity and factor spaces: two tradeable goods (agricultural and industrial) and one non-
tradable (services), and four factors (land, physical capital, labor and skills). In this simple model, 
we focus on the basic properties of comparative advantages, capital accumulation of capital, and 
diversification of consumption as income increases, while abstracting away issues related to 
technological change. The starting point in our analysis is a simple agrarian economy, where the 
capital stock is accumulated by landlords, while the rest of the population is in the subsistence 
sector. At first, even landlords only consume agricultural goods, although they leave bequests. In 
such a setting, the first countries where capital accumulation in agriculture reaches the point at 
which a significant demand for manufactured goods arises would be early-comers to 
industrialization. Once there is a well-developed international market for manufactured goods, 
labor-abundant economies may develop industrial activities for the world market, even when their 
income levels are too low to induce a widespread domestic demand for those goods. These cases 
(where public education can be rationalized as a result of the interests of industrial capitalists, as in 
Galor and Moav (2006)) can be represented within the basic framework of our model, as it is briefly 
discussed in the appendix. However, in this paper, our focus is on land-rich economies where the 
demand for industrial goods is initially satisfied by imports (see Leamer, 1987), and where the 
accumulation of human capital would only be triggered by the consumption of services. Thus, while 
the basic model seems capable of being adapted to analyze different development experiences, we 
concentrate on that particular pattern and stage of economic growth. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the setup of the 
model. In section 3 we analyze the evolution of an agrarian economy and briefly comment on 
possible alternative paths that may be followed by economies of different structural configurations. 
Section 4 deals with the case where large-scale educational systems appear in land-rich economies, 
which have not gone through a previous stage of industrialization. Conclusions are then presented 
in section 5. 
2. Setup of the model 
We consider an overlapping generations economy, where agents live for two periods, and there 
is no population growth (that is, each agent has a single descendant). At the beginning, there are two 
kinds of dynasties, landowners and workers, who differ in their factor endowments only (a set of 
industrial capitalists may emerge if the economy develops a manufacturing sector). The first group has 
initially an endowment of land, which is not traded in equilibrium, and some physical capital; for 
simplicity, members of this class are assumed not to supply labor. Workers are endowed with a basic 
set of labor skills, which can be increased by acquiring (public or private) education. 
In every period, the young agent of each dynasty receives a non-negative (but not necessarily 
strictly positive) bequest from the old agent of his lineage. Those bequests are potentially taxable and, 
in the model, such taxes fund the spending on public education. The land owned by an individual 
landlord is automatically transferred to his offspring (this transfer is not included in the definition of 
bequests). Young agents use their after-tax bequests to accumulate assets: either physical capital for 
productive activities or, in the case of workers, to acquire human capital which can be purchased by 
spending on (supplementary) private education. Old agents carry out work and production, they 
consume, and decide whether and how much to transfer to their offspring as bequests. 
In the first period of their lives individuals who receive a nonnegative (after-tax) bequest 
from the previous generation decide investments on assets, which generate income in the next 
period. In the second period of their lives, all individuals allocate their income between 
consumption and the bequest they leave to the following generation. Workers also participate 
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directly in production and receive a wage. Young agents do not consume (or, equivalently, their 
consumption is included in that of their parents). 
There are three types of consumable commodities: agricultural and industrial goods, and 
services. Agricultural and industrial goods may be traded internationally, while services are non-
tradable. Agricultural goods can be produced with a subsistence technology, employing unskilled 
labor only, or by combining physical capital and land. Agricultural goods may be consumed or used 
as physical capital. Services are provided by skilled (educated) workers. Manufacturing production 
uses labor, capital and skills. 
a. Technology and production 
Agricultural goods are denoted, A , industrial goods, I , and services, N . The factors of 
production are: raw labor, L , land, T (in fixed supply), physical capital, X (which is homogeneous 
with the agricultural good) and human capital, h . Markets for goods and factors are perfectly 
competitive. 
We assume that there are no international capital movements. Therefore, young generations 
must finance physical investment and education with the bequests transferred by the previous 
generation. Thus, the trade balance is zero in every period. 
i) The agricultural sector 
We assume that good A  may be consumed or used as physical capital. Agricultural output 
can be produced with two alternative technologies. The first, that we label “subsistence” production, 
is a constant returns to scale technology with unskilled labor as its only input, generating output w%  
per worker. If this technology operates in equilibrium, w%  will be the prevailing wage.2 This 
representation would be relevant for the Argentine case of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.}. We assume that an agent with income w%  consumes agricultural goods only and does 
not leave bequests, so that the group of subsistence workers does not trade or accumulate assets. 
The second way of producing agricultural output is with a technology that uses land and 
capital as inputs. For simplicity, we suppose that each production unit, owned by a landlord, must 
occupy a fixed surface of land, T . The output of a farm with that amount of land is given by: 
( )1A At ty f X −=  
where AX  is the capital stock used in agriculture (made of goods A ), which has been carried over from 
the previous period. Capital fully depreciates in the period. The production function ( )f    has the 
traditional properties that assure the existence of an interior solution to the profit-maximization problem. 
ii) Human capital and skill formation 
Human capital (interpreted as skills) is produced through education. For simplicity, the inputs 
of this activity are assumed to consist solely of good A . The skills of an individual in period 1t +  
are a function of the resources spent on the agent's education ( )e  in period t : 
( )1t th h e+ =  
                                                     
2  The individuals in this “subsistence” sector do not play an active role in the model, but they provide a reservoir of workforce (as in 
the traditional argument of Lewis) which, we assume, is not exhausted in the relevant range of variables. In principle, there is no 
presumption that the wage in that sector is necessarily very low (although, by assumption, it does not induce a diversified 
consumption or bequests). The reservation wage could also be interpreted without changing the model as the income required to 
induce immigration. 
CEPAL - SERIE Estudios y perspectivas – Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires N° 34 
11 
with ' 0,   '' 0h h> <  
iii) The manufacturing sector 
Industrial goods are assumed to be produced with labor, capital and human capital: 
( )1, ,I I I It t t ty g L X h−=  
where IL  is the number of workers employed in manufacturing, Ih  their average level of skills, 
and IX  the amount of capital used in the sector, and carried over from the previous period. For the 
sake of concreteness, we adopt the following Cobb-Douglas specification: 
( ) ( ) ( )L XI I I It Iy z L X hρ ρ ϕ=  
with 1L Xρ ρ+ =  and ( ) ( )' 0. 0 0I Ih zϕ ϕ> >  indicates the productivity coefficient when only 
unskilled labor is employed. If ( )w h  is the wage of a worker with skills h , it can be shown that, 









ϕρ ϕ>  
That is, the manufacturing sector will not demand skilled labor when the increase in wages as 
h  increases from zero is steeper than the corresponding increase in productivity. If this is the case, 
and manufacturing production was to start, industrial labor would be drawn from the pool of 
subsistence workers, at a fixed wage w% . Then, given the elastic supply of labor, and, for a given 
price Ip , the value of the marginal productivity of capital at the optimal level of benefits when 
0h = , would be: 
( ) ( ) 1, 0 XLI I I Ir p w s z p w ρρϕ − =  % %  
where s  is a constant that depends on the share parameters ρ . Industrial activities would not be 
initiated in the open economy for an aggregate capital stock X  if the marginal product of capital in 
agriculture exceeds the rate of return in the manufacturing sector: 
( ) ( ), 'I Ir p w f X<%  
In the rest of the paper, it will be assumed that this condition holds for all relevant values of 
X , implying that the international price Ip  is too low and the productivity of capital in agriculture 
too high to induce industrialization in the late-comer land-rich economy we are considering. The 
case of the economies that industrialize is schematically addressed in the appendix. 
iv) The service sector 
The third consumable good, N , is interpreted as an urban, relatively sophisticated service, 
the production of which requires only skilled labor.3 An individual who demands services hires 
skilled workers competitively, and consumes the output they produce, which depends on the 
                                                     
3  The assumption here is that, if the economy does not develop an industrial sector, the production of consumer services would be the 
only source of demand for skills. This is clearly a strong simplification, which disregards other important activities which require the 
input of skilled workers, such as the public administration and education itself; however, it may be thought that those “intermediate” 
demands for skills would appear when the economy has reached a stage of sophistication and diversified consumption that induce a 
significant “final demand”, like that emphasized in the stylized argument of the text. 
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number of persons who participate in the supply of the services as well as on their average level of 
human capital: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ),Nt t t t t t ty n g h n h g h dhψ= ∫  
where Ny  is the volume of services, produced by n  workers with a distribution function of skills 
( )g h , which are supplied to a given customer. Given the wage ( )w h  associated with a level of 
skills h , the value of services consumed per individual is given by ( ) ( )N Np c n w h g h dh= ∫ . 
Consumers are assumed to care about the quality of the suppliers of services (and output is 
assumed to grow unboundedly with h ), but to a limited extent on the number of workers who 
contribute to production. The intuition behind this assumption is simply that, for a wide range of 
services (from medical attention to entertainment, say), when a certain plateau of suppliers is 
reached, additional workers make little difference for the utility of the resulting consumption, but 
this is enhanced with an increase in the skills applied to production. The function ψ  would then be 
strictly concave. Although this condition is sufficient to define the qualitative features of our 
argument, we make the stronger assumption that the marginal contribution of additional workers 
goes to zero at a finite number n%  of suppliers per customer. Thus, ψ  is increasing in n  up to a 
maximum n% . For simplicity, we will use the following specification: 
( ) [ ]min ,n n nψ = %  
The demand for services of an individual consumer is such that, for low levels of spending, 
both the number of workers and their qualification rise with the value of consumption up to the 
point where n%  workers are employed. All the subsequent increases in consumption result by 
augmenting the average skills of the pool of suppliers. Moreover, it can be shown that, if the wage 
function, ( )w h is convex, an individual demands only one type of workers, with skills equal to the 
optimal average as given by the consumption optimum. These statements are summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition: Given a value of expenditure in services, denoted by N Np c , and defining the 
average level of wages and skills of the workers that participate in the production of those services: 
( ) ( )w h g h dh w=∫ , and ( )hg h dh h=∫ , with the elasticity of wages with respect to skills: 
( ) ( ) ( )'w
hh w h
w h
ε =  
• If the function ( )w h  is convex, then the agent will demand only one quality of labor, 
with skills h h=  
• If there exists *h  such that ( )* 1w hε =  and ( ) **N N
p c n n
w h
= ≤ % , then *n and *h h=  are, 
respectively, the number of workers hired by the consumer and their level of skills. 
• Otherwise, if either no *h  verifies ( )* 1w hε =  or, if there exists such *h ,but ( )*N N
p c n
w h
≥ % , 
then the optimal amount of labor is n%  while the average h  verifies that ( )N Np c w hn =% . 
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Proof: The maximal production of services for a given cost solves: 
( ) ( ) ( )max         *n hg h dhψ ∫  
s.t. ( ) ( )N Np c n w h g h dh= ∫  
( ) 1g h dh =∫  
The dual problem is, 
( ) ( ) ( )min        **n w h g h dh∫  
s.t. ( ) ( )y n hg h dhψ= ∫  
( ) 1g h dh =∫  
Since ( )w    is convex, ( ) ( ) ( )( )w h g h dh w hg h dh>∫ ∫  for every skill distribution ( )g h . 
Cost minimization implies that the optimal demand is concentrated at skills h , so that ( )g h  is 
non-zero only at h . Problem ( )*  reduces to: 
( )max n hψ , subject to ( )N Np c nw h= , ( )hg h dh h=∫  
The variables of choice are n  and h . The first order conditions for a solution are: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
:    '
:    '
n n h w h





where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier of the cost constraint. Then we have that: 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )




n hw h hψ
ψε ψ ε= ≤ =  
with equality for an interior solution. 
Recall that ( )nψε  is either 1 (for n n≤ % ) or 0  (for n n> % ). Then, according to condition 
( )1  the optimal amount of n  must verify that at an interior solution ( ) 1nψε =  while h  must be 
such that ( )w hε  is also equal to 1. On the other hand, the expenditure on services ( N Np c ) is 
given. Therefore, the amount *h  such that ( )* 1w hε =  must verify that ( ) **N N
p c n n
w h
= ≤ % . If so, the 
optimal amounts of labor and average human capital are *n n=  and *h h= . Otherwise, condition 
( )1  verifies with strict inequality, and the optimal amount n  is not interior, that is ( ) 0nψε = , 
implying that n n> % . Then, the choice problem of the agent is just to maximize n% h , subject to 
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( )N Np c nw h= . The solution to this problem obtains at n n= %  while h  is simply the value **h  
such that ( )**N Np c w hn =% . 
b. The agents 
Individuals, within as well as across generations, are identical in their preferences and innate 
abilities. 
i) Preferences 
Preferences are defined over consumption-bequest bundles, 4, , , ,  oA I Nc c c c b c += ∈ℜ , 
where jc  is the quantity consumed of good j , while 
ob  is the bequest (measured in terms of 
agricultural goods) left to offspring (we reserve the notation b  for the bequest received by the agent 
when young). 
These preferences capture the intuition that consumers prefer a diversified bundle, but there 
are certain consumption thresholds to be reached before adding an additional degree of diversity. 
We partition the consumption space into four subsets (which may be thought of as “stages”), 
according to which thresholds have been exceeded (or equivalently, what degree of consumption 
diversification has been reached). Within each stage, preferences are described by a (stage-specific) 
Stone-Geary function. Preferences and the associated demand curves have implicit an ordering of 
the goods which are part of the consumption basket at different levels of income. There are four 
stages: i) consumption of agricultural goods ( A ) only; ii) consumption of A  and positive bequests; 
iii) consumption of A  and industrial ( I ) goods as well as positive bequests; iv) consumption of 
goods A , I  and services ( N ), and positive bequests. 











Proposition: u represents a rational preference ordering. 
Proof: We have to show that the ordering ( )p%  defined by ( )u c  over C  is complete and 
transitive, as well as monotonic. 
Completeness follows immediately. If two bundles c  and c  belong to C  two cases are possible: 
• ic C∈  and jc C∈  with i j≠ . Then, by definition, if i j> , c cp , while j i> , c cp . 
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• , ic c C∈ . Then, either ( ) ( )u c u c≤  and therefore c cp  or ( ) ( )u c u c≤ , that is 
c cp . 
Similarly for transitivity: consider , ,c c c C∈ , where c cp  and c cp . Four cases are possible: 
• , , ic c c C∈ . Then, by definition ( ) ( )u c u c≤ , while ( ) ( )u c u c≤ . Therefore 
( ) ( )u c u c≤ , that is c cp . 
• , ic c C∈ and jc C∈ , i j≠ . By definition, since, c cp , i j< . Therefore c cp . 
• ic C∈ and , jc c C∈ , i j≠ . Since c cp , i j< . Therefore, c cp . 
• ic C∈ , jc C∈  and kc C∈  i j≠ , j k≠  and i k≠ . Then, since c cp , i j< , and 
since c cp , j k< . Therefore, i k<  and c cp . 
Finally, to show monotonicity, just consider c cp . Again, we can analyze this by cases: 
• If ic C∈ , jc C∈ , with i j≠ , by the definition of 1 4,...,C C , given 1 4k≤ ≤ , for every 
k kc C∈  there exists l lc C∈  such that k lc cp , while for every l lc C∈  there is no 
k kc C∈  such that l kc cp . Therefore, if c cp  then i j< , that is c cp . 
• If , ic c C∈  then, since each u  is monotonic, ( ) ( )u c u c≤ . This implies that c cp . 
In all cases, whenever an income threshold is crossed (when the individual can purchase the 
minimum consumption quantities of a certain stage), the agent prefers the most diversified 
consumption bundle attainable (that is, consumption corresponds to the highest feasible stage). 
Regarding the incentive for leaving a bequest, individual welfare varies directly with the amount of 
resources left to an offspring, independently of the use of that bequest by the next generation. This 
implies, in particular, that savings depend only on the income of the adult agent, and not on the 
expected return on assets.4 
Although this particular formulation of preferences has features that are not altogether 
appealing (like potential jumps in quantities demanded in the transition from one stage to another, 
see below), it captures a differentiation between “basic needs” and “luxury goods”, and generates a 
“consumption ladder” where new goods get included into the basket as income grows. 
ii) Demand functions 
Demand curves arise from maximizing welfare subject to a budget constraint, which in its 
most general form is given by: 
o
A I I N Nc p c p c b i+ + + ≤  
                                                     
4  This form of bequest motive (that is, the “joy of giving”) is common in the recent literature on income distribution and growth (see, 
in particular, Galor and Moav, 2006). The assumption that the rate of return is irrelevant in the decision to leave bequests does not 
greatly affect the qualitative results emphasized in the paper. However, it may have strong implications in some contexts. In 
particular, this type of savings function allows the existence of states where the marginal net product of capital is negative. Also, 
initial differences in endowments may have no effect on steady state consumption, while that would not happen, say, with standard 
Euler equations if all agents face the same interest rate, since the ratio of marginal utilities of any two agents would be preserved 
over time. 
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where i  is total income of the old agent. With the particular functional form we have adopted for 
preferences, optimization will yield threshold income levels, determining the transition from one 
diversification stage to the following. From standard methods we obtain:  
Lemma: The consumption-bequest baskets of an agent are as follows: 
In 1C : 1 1 1:A A Ac c i c i≤ = =% . 
In 2C : 
( )( )1 11A Ac i i cβ= − − +% %  
and 
( )1ob i iβ= − %  
In 3C :  
( )2 2o ob i i bβ= − + %%  
( ) ( )2 3 21A A Ac c i iβ α= + − − %%  
( ) ( )3 21I I Ip c i iβ α= − − %  
where 2 2 2
o
Ai c b= + %% % . 
In 4C :  
( )( )3 3o oIb i i p bβ= − + %%  
( ) ( )( )4 3 31A A I Ac i i p cβ α= − − +% %  
( ) ( )( )4 3 31I I I I I Ip c i i p p cβ α= − − +% %  
( ) ( ) ( )( )4 31 N Inw h i i pβ α= − − %  
where 3 3 3 3 3
o
A I Ii c p c b= + + %% % % . 
Proof: Immediate, from the maximization of ( )u c  subject to the budget constraint. 
Notice that while there is no jump in agricultural consumption when making the transition 
from the first to the second stage, there may be jumps in either consumption or bequests when 
making any of the subsequent transitions. To fix this idea, consider the case of the transition into 
industrial consumption. As soon as 2i i≥ % , it must be the case that 2A Ac c≥ %  and 2o ob b≥ % . However, 
it could be that, for instance, 
2
*
2lim A Ai i c c→ >% % and 2 2lim
o o
i i
b b→ ≤% % . This would imply that after crossing 
the threshold, consumption of agricultural goods has a discrete drop, and bequests go up. The 
opposite situation, where consumption increases and bequests (hence, capital accumulation) fall 
after the transition, is also feasible. Since this last case would imply that the economy may get 
trapped in an oscillation around transitions, we will impose conditions such that this possibility is 
avoided. 
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Once having eliminated the possibility of having oscillations at the transition thresholds, the 
structure of demands can be used to distinguish between two economies with the same amounts of 
land and aggregate capital bur exhibiting different income distributions. More precisely, calling 
these economies ( )1ε T, X  and ( )2ε T, X , where T  and X  are the given amounts of land and 
capital, if the number of landlords in them are, respectively, 1m  and 2m , with 1 2m m<  we have: 
Lemma: If the consumptions in ( )1ε T, X  and ( )2ε T, X  are 1cε  and 2cε , with 1 ic Cε ∈  and 
2
jc Cε ∈ , then, i j≥ . 
Proof: A representative landlord in 1ε  has, according to our characterization of the 
agricultural sector, an income: 
( ) ( )1 1
1
1A
ti f X m−
= = T, X  
while an average landlord in 2ε  earns: 
( ) ( )2 1
2
1A
ti f X m−
= = T, X  
Since 1 2m m< , 1 2i i> . Then, by the definition of demands, 1 2c cε ε> . Then if 1
ic Cε ∈  
and 2
jc Cε ∈ either i j=  or i j> . It can also be noticed that, since bequests increase with 
income, economy 2ε  will reach a given level of the capital stock at an earlier date than the 
economy where property is more subdivided. 
3. Growth and structural evolution 
a. An agricultural economy 
We start by analyzing an economy where only good A is produced and consumed. Here, 
unskilled workers work in the subsistence sector, consuming w%  and have no other choices 
available. Landlords invest in physical capital all the bequest they receive, and choose their 
consumption/bequest bundle in the second period. By assumption, in this stage, only the agricultural 
good is produced and consumed. Then, if the initial capital stock (received by the first generation) 
is 0X , the demand functions discussed before induce the following dynamics: 
Proposition: Let 11 2 2 2,  
o
A Ai c i c b= = +% %% % % , assume that ( ) 10f i< %  and that there is at least a 
value of X  such that ( )( )1X f X iβ= − % . Then: 
• there will be two fixed points for ( )( )1f X iβ − % , 1ˆ lX  and 1ˆ hX  (low and high, 
respectively), 
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• the economy will reach a steady state in 2C  (where landlords leave positive bequests and 
consume only agricultural goods) if and only if ( ) ( )2 0 1 1ˆ li f X f X i> ≥ >% %  and 
( )1 2ˆ hf X i< % . 
Proof: By assumption, ( ) 10 0f i− <%  and there exists X  such that ( )( )1X f X iβ= − % . 
Then, since ( )( )1f X iβ − %  is strictly concave, it has two fixed points, 1ˆ lX  and 1ˆ hX , with 
1 1
ˆ ˆl hX X≤ . The fixed points are steady states of the dynamics of the capital stock (and, equivalently, 
bequests). 1
ˆ lX is unstable, while 1
ˆ hX  is stable under the dynamics defined by 2
ob  on 
2C . 
If 0X  is such that 
( ) ( )2 0 1 1ˆ li f X f X i> > >% %  and ( )1 2ˆ hf X i< % , there will be capital 
accumulation, and the economy will not be trapped in a subsistence equilibrium where bequests are 
zero. Furthermore, capital accumulation will stop at 1
ˆ hX  while the economy is still in 
2C . 
Conversely, if the economy reaches a steady state in 
2C , it must be at either one of the fixed points, 
be it because 0 1
ˆ lX X=  or because the dynamics leads to the stable value 1ˆ hX . 
b. The transition to industrial consumption 
If capital accumulation proceeds, landlords would start consuming manufactured goods. 
Some properties for this stage can be summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition: If ( ) ( )1 2 2ˆ hf X i f X> = %%  and ( ) ( )( )1 '0 XLXI Ip w f Xs z ρρρ ϕ< % : 
• the economy will enter stage 3 (with consumption of goods and bequests of landlords in 
3C ), 
• the manufactured goods consumed by landlords will be supplied from imports, and there 
will be no domestic production. 
Proof: If the capital required for entering stage 3, 2X%  is less than 1ˆ hX  the economy will not 
get trapped in stage 2. The expression on Ip  just restates the condition for no production of good 
I  discussed before. 
This result indicates the conditions for the economy to enter 3C , with consumption of 
industrial goods, obtained through imports. However, there may be the possibility that in the 
transition to that stage, consumption rises as much as to lower the bequests (and therefore the 
capital for the next period) to levels below the transition point, forcing the economy to return to 
stage 2. A condition to avoid that trap is summarized in the following: 
Theorem: A sufficient condition for not returning to stage 2 is that ( )2 1 2oi i bβ − < %% % . 
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Proof: The economy enters stage 3 once the capital stock exceeds 2X% , with ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1ˆ ˆh lf X f X f X> >% . But in order to ensure that it does not return to 2C , the unstable 
steady state at 3C , 2ˆ
lX , must be such that ( ) ( )2 2ˆ lf X f X≤ % . 
The functions that characterize the dynamics of bequests at 2C  and 3C  are: 
2C : ( )1 1ob i i i iβ β β= − = −% %  
3C : ( ) ( )2 2 2 2o o ob i i b i i bβ β β= − + = − −% %  
Since the only variable is i , the latter is a parallel displacement of the former. Then, if we 
take the difference between them, say ob  in 3C  less ob  in 2C , suppose that: 
( ) ( )2 2 1 0    IIoi b iβ β− − + >% %  
If the sign of this expression is positive, there is an upwards displacement of bequests in 
going from 2C  to 3C . If so, the fixed points at 2C , 1 1ˆ ˆ
l hX X≤ , and those at 3C , 2 2ˆ ˆl hX X≤ , will be 
such that 2 1ˆ ˆ
l lX X≤  and 1 2ˆ ˆh hX X≤ . 
In fact (II) is equivalent to ( )2 1 2oAi c bβ − < %% % , in which case we have that: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2ˆ ˆl lf X f X f X≤ ≤ %  
which ensures that capital will not decrease down from 2X% . 
We are modeling a “late comer” economy, where consumption of industrial goods grows 
significant after other countries have already developed a manufacturing sector and participate in 
international trade of goods. This means that industrial goods are available for trade. The 
international price of good I is assumed to be sufficiently low (relative to domestic factor prices) to 
discourage production: the assumption held also in the previous stage (of pure agricultural 
consumption), and will be supposed to continue holding if the economy enters into the next stage, 
where landlords consume services. We explore in the appendix the alternative scenarios of “early 
industrialization”, where the economy produces the industrial goods consumed locally, or 
manufacturing activities get started “for export” before there is a domestic demand for those goods. 
4. The rise of public education in a land-rich economy 
a. Demand for services in a late-comer economy 
As seen in the previous section, some economies may not go through a phase of industrial 
production, even if their income is such that they include manufactured goods in their consumption 
bundle. Then the economy may reach a stage with a significant demand for “sophisticated” services 
before undergoing industrialization. The following proposition describes the dynamics in this stage. 
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Proposition: Let ( )3 3 3 3 3oA I Ii f X c p c b= = + + %%% % % . If 2 3 2ˆ ˆh lX X X> >% , the economy will enter 
into stage 4, where 2ˆ
hX  and 2ˆ
lX  are, respectively, the high and low steady states when the dynamics 
of bequests is determined by dynamics on 3C . 
A sufficient condition for no having a downward-jump in bequests once in 
4C  is that 
( ) ( )3 2 3 2o oi i b bβ − < −% %% % . 
Proof: Immediate. 2 3 2ˆ ˆ
h lX X X> >%  simply establishes that accumulation in 3C  has reached 
the point where the consumption basket diversifies to include services (the condition depends on the 
price Ip ) before attaining the stable steady state at that stage. To obtain the sufficient condition for 
continued accumulation it is enough to recast the proof of Theorem 1 for 4C . 
The evolution of the consumption and production structure need not end there. The 
possibility that an economy develops an industrial sector after services, for example, may be of 
special interest. However, we shall not pursue the analysis here, and concentrate on the question of 
how the supply of educated workers to produce services is generated. 
b. The emergence of the demand for skills 
The demand for services will induce a demand for skills. We assume that the skills required 
for the provision of services require some kind of formal education, which must be acquired when 
young. Thus, at any given time the number of (adult) skilled workers is fixed: subsistence workers 
cannot migrate into the service sector. This implies that different wages can prevail in both sectors, 
since there is no arbitrage opportunity, and therefore that there are potential gains for a young 
unskilled worker considering whether to acquire human capital. But young subsistence workers are 
credit-constrained, and individual landlords will not have incentives to finance the education of 
young workers who, by assumption, can freely choose their employment and cannot commit to the 
repayment of potential “education loans”. 
As a consequence, some kind of collective action mechanism might improve the welfare of 
the elite. As in Galor and Moav (2006), but through a different channel, young landlords who 
anticipate their future demand for services might accept to finance the necessary education system 
by way of a tax on the bequests they receive. 
i) Public education 
Adult agents with an income above a certain threshold will demand services. These will be 
provided by skilled workers. Here, the education of those skilled workers is assumed to be provided 
by public school system financed by taxes on the bequests received by young landlords. The 
characteristics of this public system are decided upon by a central authority who internalizes the 
optimal behavior of the group of young landlords, and can perfectly enforce tax collection (for 
simplicity, a balanced budget is assumed). Education is supposed to be convenient for the worker 
(that is: the wage of skilled labor is higher than w% . We assume that the authority can limit the size 
of the set of individuals who receive education (in practice, this may be done by varying the 
geographical coverage of the education system, or by determining conditions of schooling such that 
some groups have preferential access). The planner internalizes the quantity-quality choice of 
individual consumers (which would be established in the manner discussed above). Here we will 
assume, for simplicity, that the solution of the policy problem will be such that number of workers 
per landlord has reached the saturation point n% , so that the number of individuals that receive 
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education is determined by that condition, and the margin of decision of the authority is on the level 
of skills to be supplied. 
Then, taking into consideration the consumption behavior of the set of landlords (denoted 
group A ), the authority will establish taxes on bequests (which, in this framework, operate as 
lump-sum transfers from landlords to the government), and choose a distribution of human capital 
( ( )g h ) that young workers to be educated will receive. This distribution (which, in the optimum 
will be concentrated on a single point) results in an average level of skills h . As stated above, skills 
are produced with (agricultural) inputs according to the function ( )h h e= . 
The results of the optimization of the policy-maker are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition: The education system will provide a single level of education e to all the set of 
individuals who receive training. If for some *e , the function ( )h    has an elasticity ( )* 1h eε =  
then the optimal amount of workers that receive education is n n≤ %  and the level of education will 
be *e . Otherwise, if ( ) 1h eε < , n%  workers will be educated and e  will verify the following 
condition between the marginal utilities of income (derived from holdings of land and physical 
capital) and education for service suppliers:  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )4 43
' '
1 1 1N NA
f b ne h e
n
i i h e
β α β α−− − = −−
%% %  
Proof: Let n  be the number of workers who receive education per unit landlord, and ( )l e  
the proportion of those agents who receive an education corresponding to spending e ; 
( ) 1l e de =∫ . Total spending in education will be ( ) 1n el e de =∫ , and the income of the average 
landlord, when old, will be: ( )( )Ai f b n el e de= − ∫ , given that the bequests received when young 
have been taxed in the amount necessary in order to finance education expenditures. Given the 
demand functions in the stage 4C , the utility of the landlord can be written as (ignoring constants): 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4 3 41 1 ln 1 lnA AN Nu i i n h e l e deβ α β α= − − − + − ∫%  
Remembering that ( )( )Ai f b n el e de= − ∫ , maximization with respect to ( )kl e  subject to 
the constraint ( ) 1l e de =∫  results in the following, if in the optimum ( ) 0kl e > : 








γ γ λ− − + − =− %  
where ( ) 41 Nγ β α= − , λ  is the multiplier of the constraint, and the average level of skills is: 
( ) ( )h h e l e de= ∫  
Considering the condition for a level of education ke e+ ∆  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
3
' 11 0k k k kA
f n e e e h e e h e
i i h
γ γ− − + ∆ − + + ∆ − =− %  






 is constant for every ke with non-zero demand. Therefore, 'h  must be the same at 
every optimal level. That is, there exists just one value *e  at which this is true, since h  is strictly 
concave. 
Then, ( )l e  is a degenerate distribution that yields a single value ( )h e , which, according to 
the preferences of the A agents, must be equal to h . 
The expression of Au  can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( )31 ln lnA Au i i nh eγ γ= − − +%  
Maximizing the utility with respect to the single variable e  results in:  
( ) ( )( )3
''1 A
h efn
i i h e
γ γ− =− %  






γγ− ≤− %   
with strict equality if the interior solution is such that n n≤ % . In that case, the ratio between 






= . With *e e= , if the optimal value of n  for 
nψ =  was larger than n% , then the solution would correspond to the level of e  that satisfies the 
corresponding FOC with n n= % ; this value would be such that ( ) 1h eε <  and *e e> . 
The proposition establishes that, if e%  is the level of education such that the elasticity of skills 
with respect of education is one, as long as the optimal spending in education is E ne≤ % % , education 
per worker will be fixed at e%  and the expansion of education will be “extensive”, through the 
increase in n . After that threshold is reached, n n= % , and the additional spending will result in 
proportional increases in e .  
In what follows we will assume for simplicity that education has already “saturated” the level 
of workers, although the model seems capable of rationalizing the existence of a stage where a 
growing number of workers receives “basic” education, followed by another where the size of the 
educated set stops increasing and the average level of skills rises. Also, if the elite is subdivided, in 
the sense that the education system is destined to satisfy the demands of groups with different 
incomes and demands for services, there can be a distribution of people who receive different 
“levels” of education; the size of the members of each level would be a function of the size of the 
set of landlords that demands services requiring those skills. In any case, if all landlords require the 
services of n%  workers, the size of the group of educated workers would be proportionate to the size 
of that elite.  
In the transition where members of group A  start to demand services, the number of workers 
who receive education is bounded at n%  per landlord. While we assume this for any economy, the 
distribution of land ownership affects the aggregate number of educated workers. Too see this 
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consider, again , two economies ( 1ε  and 2ε ) with the same amounts of land but different number or 
landlords, 1m  and 2m , respectively, with 1 2m m< . Then we have: 
Corollary: In economy 2ε , the start of education would occur later than in 1ε , but the 
number of individuals who receive education would be larger. 
Proof: Since in 1ε  services will be consumed earlier, the educational system has to be 
created before than in 2ε . On the other hand, once the critical number of educated agents, n%  per 
landlord, is reached, and maintaining the assumption that only landlords consume services, the 
number of educated agents will be 1 2m n m n<% % , that is, the number of educated individuals will be 
larger in 2ε . 
The emergence of taxation to finance education modifies the dynamics of bequests, since 
these are determined by income, which is reduced by taxation through its effects on capital. 
However, it can be shown that the condition for accumulation to proceed in the stage with 
consumption of services is the same as the condition found before, when taxation was not 
considered: 
Proposition: The same conditions on 3X%  established before for accumulation to proceed 
after the transition to stage 4 hold also with an optimal level of taxation on bequests, except if 
3 3 3
ˆ lX b X= =%%  with 0e > . 
Proof: For the proposition to hold, we have to consider a new transition value 3X b ne′ = −% . 
If ( ) ( )2 3ˆ hf X f X ′> %  and ( ) ( ) ( )3 3 3ˆ ˆl hf X f X f X′≤ ≤% , the accumulation process will continue. To 
see that this can in fact be so, recall that these conditions are verified by 3X% . So, if '3X%  is close 
enough to 3X%  we are done. In fact, expenditures on education will start from values near zero, 
since when ( )'3f X%  is very close to 3i% , ( )( )'h eh e  grows unboundedly large. That means that e  is 
very close to 0 . So, the only possible problem arises if '3 3 3ˆ
lX X X= >% % . 
ii) The price of human capital 
We are interested in analyzing the conditions that link the price of human capital to other 
parameters in the model. A first, and intuitive, result is that holding international prices constant, all 
the relevant quantities depend on the level of capital accumulation in the economy, as summarized 
in the level of bequests, b . Since the capital stock increases with b , and the value of spending in 
services is proportional to the income of landlords in excess of the threshold ( )3i i− % , if the number 
of service workers remains constant at n%  per landlord, the wages of those individuals grows 
directly with b . Such wages result from the level of skills of the workers and the unit “price of 
skills”. The evolution of that price (or, in other words, the rate of return on education) is described 
in the following proposition.  





w h e f b ne i
w
h e nh e
γ − −= = %%%  
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where, as before: ( ) 41 Nγ β α= −  
Let 3
~)~( ienbfz −−= , and let ( )( )
'ˆ f xf
f x
=  denote the logarithmic derivative of the function 
f . Education and the capital stock vary as a function of b  according to: 























′′′ = ′  
and: 
( )
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ
1 0ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
h hX en
b b n z z h h




Then, the sign of the change in the unit wage is governed by: 
( )1sgn sgn sgn 1h h
h
w w f h
b w b f h
γ γ  ′′ ′′ ∂ ∂  = = − −     ′ ′∂ ∂      
Proof: The characterization of hw  just recasts the demand function of services: 
( ) ( )3Anw h h i iγ= − %%  
or: ( ) zw h n hγ= %  




∂  obtains by differentiating with respect to b the semi-elasticity 
condition of arbitrage between investments: 




f b ne h e
z h
f b ne i h e
γ γ γ γ′ ′−− = − = =− −
%
%%  













∂  is obtained by differentiating with respect to b  the 
characterization of hw . 
Thus, the evolution of the returns on skills depends on the technological features of the 
agriculture and education sectors. For example, if the productivity of education falls less quickly 
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than the productivity of investment in sector A then, for a given rise in bequest, investment would 
be increasingly directed towards education, and at some point the wage per unit skills would.5 
c. Moving ahead: brief comments on subsequent phases 
Certainly, the creation of a large public school system might affect the way in which a late-
comer land-rich economy would evolve. Here, we briefly mention some alternative paths that may 
be followed, and which seem capable of being analyzed using the basic framework of this paper. 
i) Possible emergence of manufacturing 
At some point, the effect of decreasing returns in the primary goods sector and the expansion 
of the supply of skills could result in the emergence of a manufacturing sector. This may also occur 
if, for some reason, the international price of industrial goods increases relative to those of 
agricultural commodities. That is, industrialization may take place through a price shock or, 
possibly, as a consequence of the accumulation of factors. 
In any case, capital would flow to manufacturing. This may change the political economy in 
several ways. One issue would be whether landlords transform themselves into entrepreneurs with 
interests in both tradable sectors, or whether they are lenders of resources to a new group of 
industrial entrepreneurs (the division of the elite has been an often emphasized feature of resource-
based economies with an incipient industrialization). Also, it is likely that the group of educated 
workers gains political influence. With the emergence of manufacturing, these agents would have 
mixed interests as suppliers of services, as workers in the manufacturing sector and, if their income 
is sufficient, as consumers of industrial goods. In addition, the inflow of workers from the 
subsistence sector to the (mainly urban) industrial sector may also create a new significant group of 
influence, with interests in raising the demand for industrial labor. That configuration is likely to 
raise issues related to industrial protection and the public spending in education. 
ii) Diversified consumption by skilled workers 
If skilled workers get rich enough in the process of economic growth, they would start to 
diversify their consumption-bequest basket. If educated workers leave bequests to their offspring, 
the accumulation of resources would take a different form. The specification of the investment 
options of those workers may vary: if there is an active capital market, they could act as lenders of 
funds to owners of physical capital, as well as potential purchasers of private education. From the 
point of view of the landlords, the emergence of a privately financed education sector would 
represent a positive development, since that would lower the price of skills without taxation on the 
elite. This development may lead to a crowding-out effect against public education. 
The appearance of a demand for industrial goods by skilled workers does not vary noticeably 
the pattern of evolution in the land-rich economy: this will become more open as demand shifts 
from locally produced agricultural goods to imported manufactures, without much change 
elsewhere. The case would be different if the wage of skilled workers rises to the point where they 
also demand services. There would then be a “secondary” demand for skills (and for new skilled 
workers), on the part of the agents who previously were selling services to landlords/capitalists. 
Also, the incentives of policy-makers would change, since an A  planner would recognize that there 
are no exclusive goods any more, consumed only by landlords. An increment in the supply of skills 
would benefit the educated workers as consumers. However, the A  planner would likewise 
internalize the fact that a lower supply of skills increases the wage of educated workers, and raises 
                                                     
5  As a consequence of the assumption that the production of skills depends only on the input of goods, the result ignores a potentially 
important effect: education itself can be a (maybe large) source of demand for skills. In the context of the model, this may introduce 
a wedge between the interests of young landlords (who want education to increase the future supply of services) and the older 
generation, who would have their consumption opportunities reduced as skilled labor is drawn from the direct production of services 
to the education sector. 
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their demand for services, which would crowd out the demand by landlords. The two effects would 
be weighted when considering taxation and spending in education. 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a model that can rationalize different patterns in the emergence of 
educational systems, in a way that can be pertinent in accounting for contrasts between the 
experiences of countries in the American continent in the nineteenth century. As a representation of 
economic development, the range of validity of the model is limited by the fact that we have 
disregarded phenomena like capital movements and, especially, technical change, which should be 
central elements in a more general analysis. However, as it is the model seems useful to highlight 
different motives for the elite to finance the education of low-income workers, and to point out 
possible alternative paths of economic evolution. 
The model focuses on the demand for human-capital-intensive services of high-income 
groups. This channel can generate a demand for education, and appears because we adopt a setup 
with multiple goods, where consumption preferences are non-homothetic and the demand for skill-
intensive commodities emerges at comparatively high levels of income. We also assumed that the 
quantity and quality of labor are not perfect substitutes; consequently, the number of high-income 
agents may have strong effects on how many individuals are subsidized to accumulate human 
capital. 
Several classes of economies, with different qualitative behaviors, were identified. The first 
kind is that of early comers to industrialization. These are economies where, in the process of 
capital accumulation, agricultural productivity is high enough to generate a widespread demand for 
manufactured goods, which must be produced internally. The growth of the agricultural-industrial 
economy (with a bias towards industry, due to the higher income elasticity of the demand for the 
corresponding goods) may lead to the emergence of a demand for skills. 
A second class of economies are those which are well endowed with labor, and where 
agricultural productivity is not enough to trigger industrialization for the domestic market, but can 
engage in labor intensive manufacturing for exports if and when an international market for those 
goods develop. In this basic setup, we merely refer to the first steps of industrialization for these 
economies. Further work should certainly consider with more detail the processes of technical 
change and the incentives to supply and demand for human capital in production. Preliminary 
results suggest that in order for education to emerge as a result of a capitalist-led political choice, 
the wages of unskilled workers should be sufficiently high (see the appendix). 
Our focus was on resource-abundant economies where income growth is such that a large 
demand for industrial goods appears at a time when the supply by early comers is already well 
developed. Straightforward comparative advantage implies that those economies will import 
manufactures. If the demand for “sophisticated” services starts for incomes above a certain 
threshold, increases in the value of the output of primary goods can imply that, at some point, a 
demand for skilled labor may appear in order to satisfy that consumption by high-income groups. 
These groups, then, would not oppose the emergence of public education to increase the skills of a 
set of workers, the number of which would depend on the number of landlords who demand 
services. Hence, the diffusion of education would depend on the size of the elite and, indirectly, on 
the degree of concentration of land ownership. The growth of an educated class can change the 
political balance, and the incentives to provide public education, by incorporating into the picture a 
new influential group, and also by giving rise to a population who in some cases may self-finance 
the acquisition of skills of descendants. A large manufacturing activity may or may not arise 
“spontaneously”. Over time, a new political economy of industrial protection is likely to result from 
the interplay of the interests of landlord, capitalists, skilled workers (at first, mainly occupied in 
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services), and unskilled workers, if they participate in political decisions. Quite different paths seem 
possible according to how the implicit conflicts are processed. 
The model we have presented was inspired in part by the Argentine experience, where a 
strong public education movement appeared well before the demand for skills in manufacturing 
acquired importance. Of course, the political decision to make substantial investments in education 
had several motives, and cannot be simply attributed to the wish to “lower the costs of services for 
the landlords”. Clearly, the desire to integrate immigrants to the national society and, in general, to 
promote “civilization” (a much cited and discussed concept at the time) played a very large role. 
However, training a large number of individuals for “civilized” presupposes, at least implicitly, the 
expectation that the resulting skills will find demand in “civilized jobs”. In fact, for several decades, 
the newly educated workers were readily absorbed in a growing economy and, particularly, in the 
service sector. 
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Appendix 
a. Early industrialization: a preliminary sketch of an argument 
Consider an economy that accumulates agricultural capital before there is a significant 
international supply of industrial goods. If capital accumulation proceeds to the point where 
landlords start demanding industrial goods, they must be produced locally since the economy is 
closed for all practical matters. Then, it is clear that production would diversify into manufacturing 
as a result of the new composition of consumption demands. Thus, if and when the income of 
landlords reaches the threshold where their consumption diversifies, there would be a shift of 
capital into manufacturing, and the dynamics would change compared with the agricultural stage. 
Now, the logic of capital-skills complementarity would apply. With certain technologies, 
manufacturing skills may be acquired through on-the-job training (apprenticeship). At some point, 
the provision of public education may be in the interest of capitalists, as in Galor and Moav (2006). 
Once the early-comers to industrialization have engaged in that path, the economies that lag 
behind in capital accumulation need not follow the same sequence: when there is an active 
international market where manufactures trade for primary goods, the late-comers may industrialize 
“prematurely”, or alternatively, become producers of services for high-income groups without first 
developing manufactures. Regarding the first possibility, standard international trade arguments 
indicate that an economy with suitable factor endowments can produce industrial goods for the 
world market, independently of domestic consumption. This would be more likely if landlords are 
sufficiently frugal and entrepreneurial while agriculture is not-too-productive (which speeds up the 
arrival of the moment where investment in manufacturing becomes profitable at the margin relative 
to accumulating agricultural capital) and there is a large supply of labor capable of moving from a 
subsistence sector to manufactures (à la Lewis). Also here the provision of education would be 
likely to be predicated on a perceived demand for more skilled industrial workers. 
b. Export-led industrialization 
This case would represent an economy which, with suitable factor endowments, produces 
good I  for the world market, even without a widespread consumption of that good. Given the 
specification of the production function and the assumption that uneducated labor is supplied 
elastically at wage w% , and assuming that capital is perfectly mobile between sectors: 
Proposition: Capital X  is allocated to sector I , when workers have no skills acquired 
through education, if: 






ρ= %  is the return on capital in manufacturing and the (subsistence) wage is w% , 
while labor has the basic (zero-education) level of skills. At IX% , the minimal level of capital 
accumulation that verifies this condition, the economy will enter into the manufacturing stage. A 
sufficient condition that ensures that the economy will not return to agricultural stage, once it 
entered into the manufacturing stage is that ( )2 1 2oAi c bβ − < %% % . 
Proof: Given that IX% , the minimal value that verifies the condition is lower than the stable 
steady state in the agricultural stage, 1ˆ
hX , capital will also be invested in manufacturing. The 
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sufficient condition to avoid the return to the agricultural stage is the same as for the economy 
without production of manufactures, as described in the text. 
The condition above will be more easily satisfied with low subsistence wages, not-too-
productive agriculture and frugal capitalists. High productivity and/or high prices of good I  do as 
well induce production. 
If the workers do not save or educate and only agricultural goods are consumed, the system 
can be described by: 
( ) ( )









i f X X X r
f X r r p w h
b i i X X Xβ
= + −
′ = =




The first equation defines the income of the capitalists (agents K , who are at the same time 
the landlords) as the output of the agricultural sector plus the return on capital invested in 
manufacturing. The second equation specifies the equilibrium allocation of the capital inherited 
from the previous generation and the rate of return. The third equation establishes the bequest, and 
specifies that it must be used to install future capital in both sectors. 
In order to consider the incentives to start an educational system in such an economy, 
consider now the existence of a social planner representing the capitalist-landlord agents ( K ). This 
authority may tax agents K  (the agents who leave bequests) in order to finance public education, as 
a representative of that group. The incentive would be to educate individuals will work in industry 
I . In principle, it may be the case that the industry hires educated and uneducated workers. Let µ  
be the fraction of the labor force ( L ) that is skilled, and let ( )h e  be their average level of human 
capital, which corresponds to a per-individual expenditure in education denoted by e . Then, total 
spending in education would be: 
E Leµ=  
The allocation of resources would be driven by the maximization of the total returns to agents 
K  derived from agriculture and industrial activities. 
Then, it may be shown that: 
Proposition: Spending in education will not start as long as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
01, ,0 0
0I I I L
f b X r p w h w
ϕ
ρ ϕ
′′ ′− = >% %  
and this condition can be expressed as: 
( )














′  ′>  %  
Proof: Skilled workers must earn at least w% . Otherwise they will not accept employment in 
manufacturing. Consider now a K  planner contemplating an investment in education, starting from 
a situation where all industrial workers are unskilled. The problem of the planner can be stated as:  




I I IX L e
f b X Le p h e L X wLρ ρµ µ ϕ µ− − + − %  
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The expression indicates the aggregate (future) income of a (now) young capitalist, given that 
the level of bequests is b , a fraction µ  has received skills h , so that the average level of skills is 
µ h , and all workers L  receive a wage w% . Clearly, all choice variables must be non negative. A 
solution would satisfy first order conditions given by: 
( )
( )
:      0     
':      - 0     
:      - 0     
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ρ = %  (at an interior solution for L ).  
On the other hand, (ii) is equivalent to: 
( )
( )
( )'- 0IIe h e p yf
e e L
ϕ
ϕ′+ ≤  






















ρ ϕ → ′≤
%
 
which recalling the L'Hopital rule (







= ) yields the desired result. 
On the other hand, from ( )( )L X1-= s 0I Ir p w ρ ρϕ % , with s  a constant, we have the equivalent 
expression sought. 
c. Early industrialization for the domestic market 
The discussion in the previous exercise assumed that the price Ip  was determined in the 
international market. But, if there is no developed world market (or the country is the “first 
comer”), industrial goods cannot be purchased abroad, but must be produced internally when the 
demand arises. Production diversifies in parallel with consumption. Assuming that the no-education 
condition holds, the economy would now be described by the following equations: 
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• Demand for industrial goods: 
( ) ( )3 21I KI Ip y i iβ α= − − %  
where the notation is as before, and 
Ki  is the income of the landlord/capitalists. 
• Income of agents K : 
 ( ) ( ), , 0K A I I Ii f X r p w h X= + =%  
where, as before, ,A IX X  are the capital stocks in each sector, Ir  the rate of return of capital in 
manufacturing. 
• Supply of good I : 
 ( ), ,I I Iy y p w h= %  
• Allocation of capital: 
 ( ) ( ), ,0A I If X r p w′ = %  
• Allocation of bequests: 
 A Ib X X= +  
• Employment in manufacturing: 
 ( ), ,I IL X l p w h= %  
where l  is the labor/capital ratio. 
• Dynamics of bequests: 
 ( )2 2o K ob i i bβ= − + %%  
The system can be completed by specifying the choices on education, which could be 
determined, as before, by a government that optimizes on behalf of group K . 
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II. Studies on development 
economics: notes for an agenda 
Sebastián Galiani and Daniel Heymann 
Abstract 
Economic development implies concrete transformations in the 
social system. Tracking such processes and representing them in a 
fairly precise way poses major analytical and practical challenges. This 
document is a preliminary reflection based on existing literature. 
Rather than a detailed or exhaustive review, it is a brief exercise aimed 
at identifying some of the main issues and questions as a prelude to 
subsequent studies on economic development. A natural starting point 
for this analysis is a consideration of the proximate sources of 
economic growth, that is, variables that have a more or less direct 
effect on the expansion of aggregate production volumes. This topic is 
the subject of section 2. The intensity of the accumulation and the form 
it takes, along with its level of productivity, all depend on the 
opportunities generated by the economy’s structure and the way these 
are perceived and processed by agents. In turn, the way in which agent 
interactions are organized affects incentives and restricts or guides 
behaviour. At one time, the literature stressed the link between 
economic development and structure; now the emphasis is on 
institutional issues; these matters are briefly discussed in section 3. 
Lastly, section 4 deals with empirical research into determining factors 
of development and examines criteria for analysing specific case 
studies on the basis of the foregoing discussions.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic development implies concrete transformations in the social system. Substantial 
quantitative growth of an economy over a long period of time is not the same phenomenon as a 
mere scale expansion of the original state. Higher income tends to imply diversification of inputs, 
products and consumption, which in turn generate changes in the structure of supply and demand, 
with a more elaborate division of labour. Such changes, along with technological developments in 
response to various economic incentives, affect the way in which agents interact and even their 
attitudes and behaviour. At the same time, the relative prices of goods and factors change, which 
alters income distribution as a result. The interest matrix, the configuration of coalitions and the 
level of influence of various groups are modified accordingly. The resulting forces can act upon the 
characteristics and functioning of institutions and therefore, modify the behaviour and the relations 
of economic and political agents. Incentives, behaviour and the patterns of interactions among 
individuals and groups all have effects on the pace and direction of economic growth. Meanwhile, 
other economies are also evolving, and this also leads to changes in opportunities, restrictions and 
even visions and beliefs. Eventually, even the natural environment undergoes modifications, 
thereby opening up or closing off opportunities and options. 
Tracking such processes and representing them in a fairly precise way poses major analytical 
and practical challenges. This document is a preliminary reflection based on existing literature. 
Rather than a detailed or exhaustive review, it is a brief exercise aimed at identifying some of the 
main issues and questions as a prelude to subsequent studies on economic development.  
Traditionally, the various theories of economic development have stressed the significance of 
structural factors based on conditions such as abundance of natural resources, specialization in 
activities that offer good opportunities for technical improvements, the existence of high saving 
rates and levels of capital formation, extensive markets or other circumstances that may encourage a 
faster pace of technological change (see, inter alia, Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). More recently, a 
high rate of accumulation of human capital has also been identified as an important factor in 
economic development (see, for example, Barro and Lee, 1994, Mankiw and others, 1992 and 
Lucas, 1988). Currently, however, emphasis has shifted to social factors, particularly the effects of 
institutions and culture on incentives (see, inter alia, North, 1981, Landes, 1998, Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2000 and Acemoglu and others, 2004). 
There is clear evidence that incentives (in the economic, social and political areas) and the 
institutions that mould them are important for development. However, institutions themselves are 
influenced by political and economic structures, that is, they are endogenously determined. 
Furthermore, the economic structure seems to be a central factor in specific growth mechanisms and 
in the interest matrix that in turn affects politics. Thus, a better understanding of the process of 
economic development requires consideration of the joint determination of economic structure and 
social institutions (Ocampo, 2001). 
A natural starting point for this analysis is a consideration of the proximate sources of 
economic growth, that is, variables that have a more or less direct effect on the expansion of 
aggregate production volumes.6 One of the basic components in any development process is the 
persistent and sizable increase in the quantity of goods and services produced and made available to 
the population. It is therefore crucial to specify the effects and mechanisms which directly or 
indirectly generate such growth. This topic is the subject of section 2. Of course, there is an 
                                                     
6  Hoffman (2001) has argued that proximate causes are the channels through which “ultimate causes” operate, and thus should not be 
interpreted as independent from the latter. In turn, the effect of potential ultimate causes would depend on the configuration of the 
economy. 
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abundance of literature on the direct determinants of “the wealth of nations”. Yet despite the 
progress made in understanding economic growth, many major questions remain unanswered.  
Several issues are well established. Although the accumulation of physical capital and an 
increasingly skilled workforce are central factors for growth, they only explain some of the 
differences between countries in terms of levels and growth rates of income. Movements in 
resource productivity seem to be quite important, which draws attention to the mechanisms and 
incentives that generate knowledge and techniques for subsequent application in production. The 
accumulation of factors and productive knowledge in turn depends on the opportunities and 
incentives offered by technological, structural and institutional factors and the international 
environment. In addition, the growth rates of different economies are interdependent, linked by a 
complex set of influences which presumably vary according to the economic structure. This 
structure is in turn shaped by external trade, knowledge flows and the effects of the movement of 
goods and investment on skills and incentives to innovate, imitate and apply technologies. 
Therefore, even if the accumulation of resources is a basic and crucial element of growth, there 
remain questions about what determines this accumulation and the factors that affect productivity 
and interactions between economies. 
The intensity of the accumulation and the form it takes, along with its level of productivity, 
all depend on the opportunities generated by the economy’s structure and the way these are 
perceived and processed by agents. In turn, the way in which agent interactions are organized 
affects incentives and restricts or guides behaviour. At one time, the literature stressed the link 
between economic development and structure; now the emphasis is on institutional issues; these 
matters are briefly discussed in section 3. Lastly, section 4 deals with empirical research into 
determining factors of development and examines criteria for analysing specific case studies on the 
basis of the foregoing discussions.  
2. Determinants of economic growth 
Available evidence suggests that rapid increases in worldwide per capita output (implying 
visibly different standards of living from one generation to the next) are typical of the last two 
centuries (Maddison, 2001). During this time, in which the population also expanded considerably 
(and despite the fluctuations, crises and blatant inequalities among regions and individuals), there 
has been a large, and so far uninterrupted, upward surge of the aggregate capacity to produce goods 
and services in comparison with previous periods. This rise has been associated with a much more 
frequent emergence of major technological changes (see Fogel, 2004).  
However, there remain major differences in the state and performance of different economies. 
Between 1960 and 2000, real per capita income in the developing world grew at an annual average 
rate of 2.3%. An expansion of this order of magnitude is far from negligible, as it means a doubling 
of real per capita income every 30 years. The observed growth also went hand in hand with 
improvements in social indicators (such as literacy, child mortality and life expectancy), although 
income distribution remained strongly biased, and poverty levels quite high. During the same 
period, however, the annual per capita growth rate of developed countries was 2.7%. In other 
words, aside from emblematic cases of intense growth –mainly in Asia– there has been no strong 
narrowing of the gap between developing and developed economies. Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa grew significantly until the decade of 1970 but then their growth stalled, with 
somewhat of an upturn in the decade of 1990. These experiences show that the convergence of 
levels of income and output is far from being inevitable or automatic. While income and output tend 
to converge among rich countries as a group, there is no such convergence between groups of rich 
and poor countries (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Therein lies the special importance of growth analysis 
from the point of view of relatively low-income economies. 
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The theory of economic growth has evolved considerably, particularly in terms of modelling 
strategies and methods. Aside from changes in emphasis and representation techniques, however, 
some issues and discussions have remained relevant over time. Traditionally, growth was 
represented as a result of the accumulation of physical capital and exogenous increases in 
productivity. Levels of income and growth rates during the transition were associated with the 
frugality of the population, as expressed in average savings rates. These arguments implicitly 
disregard the potential problems (identified in traditional Keynesian literature) of transforming the 
disposition to save into actual investment, and tend to view such issues as factors that may influence 
the pattern of business cycles, but not primarily the growth trend.7 
In any event, there appears to be a natural association between economic growth and 
willingness to save (either represented by a propensity to save out of income or as an impatience 
rate in optimizing-agent models): if, for any reason, a society has a strong preference for immediate 
consumption and therefore acts in a way that sacrifices the availability of resources in times to 
come, it can hardly expect the future to be more prosperous than the present. Though it might sound 
trivial and the temporal precedence of frugality and higher incomes can be debated (see Rodrik, 
1998), growth requires agents to be willing to weigh up the future in their decisions, and conditions 
that enable that willingness to be translated into concrete actions. The point clearly raises social and 
institutional issues, as they affect the expected returns on savings and investments. 
A continued process of capital accumulation and increases in the level of production must 
overcome potential decreasing returns on the use of resources. It was not always considered 
possible for this to happen indefinitely: some classic theories maintain that economies eventually 
tend towards a steady state with more or less fixed values of per capita output and capital (see J. S. 
Mill, 1848 and Baumol, 1951). Of course, Solow’s basic growth model (1956) also generates 
convergence towards a steady state in per capita output, unless there are persistent exogenous 
increases in productivity. Much of the recent literature has sought to modify this result by means of 
arguments that may rationalize persistent growth as an economic outcome, with no continuous 
decline in the returns on capital, and therefore on investment incentives (Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  
The literature has identified different ways of avoiding decreasing returns on investment. The 
mechanisms that can sustain productivity include: (i) technical spillovers (external to firms) that 
boost capital productivity as accumulation proceeds (Frankel, 1962; Romer, 1986); (ii) constantly 
generating “learning by doing” effects in production (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Young, 1991; 
1993); (iii) increasing supplies of human capital, which raise the productivity of physical capital 
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966, Lucas, 1988); (iv) continuous increases in the quality of inputs through 
profit-motivated innovation (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992); and (v) a 
persistent widening in the variety of inputs used in production as the scale of the economy gets 
larger (Romer, 1990).  
All these growth channels have common features. In particular, in one way or another, they 
are based on steady increases in knowledge applied to production. Total productivity increases 
because, through various means, agents learn to improve and diversify the supply of inputs and 
increase the returns on resources used. Another similarity is the hypothesis (necessary for 
unlimited-growth models) that innovation capacity facilitates cumulative increases in productivity 
at a constant rate. This hypothesis can be expressed in several forms, for instance by suggesting that 
                                                     
7  The distinction between short term and long term is not strictly valid from an analytical or practical point of view, given that both 
types of phenomena occur as a result of the same sets of decisions. Macroeconomic instability or the perception that activity can 
undergo sudden declines seem capable of seriously discouraging investment and the adoption of more productive techniques 
(through channels determined, for example, by a preference for flexibility). Also, certain major fluctuations in output (especially in 
solvency crises) could be a reflection of errors in agents’ forecasts of production and income trends (see Heymann and Sanguinetti, 
1998). It would be a matter for discussion in concrete instances whether and how these effects are relevant (and therefore when it is 
necessary to deal explicitly with beliefs and risk perceptions about long-term macroeconomic performance), or when it is acceptable 
to use stylizations that, as in much of the literature, discount issues of coordination and formation of expectations in order to 
represent growth. 
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there are externalities such that, as a reduced form, aggregate output is proportional to aggregate 
capital stock, the application of a certain amount of human capital in education increases total 
human capital at a constant pace, or a given amount of research generates fixed proportional 
increases in the range or quality of inputs.  
Aside from these general similarities, however, there are considerable differences between 
the various mechanisms, as reflected in the contrasting visions on what drives and restricts growth. 
For instance, infant industry arguments would be relevant if “learning by doing” were the engine of 
productivity increases, but not if the priority were the variety of inputs available for production. If 
the accumulation of physical capital is what generates positive spillover effects for the economy as 
a whole, the conclusions to be drawn would be different from those reached if productivity 
increases occur in response to a greater intensity in terms of human capital. Stressing the use of 
knowledge physically incorporated in objects, or the imitation and adaptation of methods, 
techniques and equipment is not the same as technology creation in the true sense of the phrase. In 
Leibenstein’s X-efficiency argument (1976), the competitive environment stimulates productivity, 
while the prospect of monopoly revenues is what promotes innovation in Schumpeterian analyses. 
In other words, means of generating and propagating technical progress may, in principle, differ 
considerably, and have varying implications in terms of conditions for boosting or restricting 
productivity increases. 
The models also differ regarding the importance they assign to scale effects. Some arguments 
place strong emphasis on such effects. According to Romer (1990), if potential innovators face 
fixed costs of resources in order to extend by a certain proportion the range of inputs (sold in 
monopoly conditions with isoelastic demand), the aggregate growth rate will increase in line with 
the size of the market. This would result in divergence rather than convergence between 
opportunities for raising productivity and between growth rates of (closed) economies of a different 
scale. Other arguments weaken the general applicability of this conclusion. In Young (1998), 
although innovation may be used to increase the quantity or quality of inputs, it is the increases in 
quality that govern aggregate growth. A larger economy that produces a greater variety of inputs 
must therefore use more resources to generate a homogenous growth rate in the quality of inputs. 
As a result, the growth rate does not depend on the scale. Nevertheless, the level of productivity and 
per capita income does increase with the aggregate volume of resources in the economy. Other 
analyses (see Burgess and Venables, 2004) identify various clustering effects that can generate a 
concentration of activities in certain locations and promote and sustain income differentials by 
geographical region (although regions should not be automatically interpreted as having the same 
relevance as countries). 
Scale effects are also potentially linked to “strategic complementarities”, namely situations in 
which the expansion of certain agents’ activities raises the marginal returns on the expansion of 
others’ (see Cooper and John, 1988). These situations are in turn conducive to multiple equilibria or 
coordination phenomena in which the decisions of agents motivated by observing or predicting that 
others are acting in the same way could in principle generate a collective “big push” that rescues the 
economy from a “trap” and produces an upsurge in growth. This features in many models or 
arguments in the form of mechanisms such as complementarities in the productivity of capital, 
human capital, research and development, productive linkages, transaction costs associated with the 
density of market exchanges or even the choices that agents make to engage in either innovation or 
rent-seeking activities.8 Yet the existence of strategic complementarities does not necessarily imply 
multiple equilibria, it simply means that they are a possibility. It is therefore particularly important 
to establish the validity and significance of an effect in specific cases, rather than its mere potential.  
                                                     
8  See, for instance, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Hirschman (1958), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), 
Krugman (1991), Rodrik (1996), Acemoglu (1996) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2001). 
Two essays on development economics 
38 
The issue is a general one. The literature has identified many plausible effects that may play a 
role in determining development patterns. Each model emphasizes a subset of effects, and treats 
them as responsible for the economy’s growth throughout its development. Although this is 
perfectly natural from an analytical point of view, certain mechanisms are probably particularly 
relevant in some circumstances and less so in others. Identifying when and how certain mechanisms 
have visible effects, and what conditions determine their intensity probably requires combining 
statistical and historical methods, and using both aggregate and microeconomic evidence (see, for 
instance, Pack, 1994, Mokyr, 2002).  
Although the mechanisms described in the literature are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
any attempt to represent them simultaneously could easily result in unmanageable analytical 
complexity. It is therefore extremely difficult to formulate a general model of development or 
economic growth capable of generating precise propositions. At the same time, the range of validity 
of each model seems limited. It has been traditionally suggested that that the activities that serve as 
“conveyors” of technical progress vary according to time and place (Prebisch, 1952). The challenge 
therefore lies in strategic simplifications for interpreting and discussing concrete processes, while 
bearing in mind that the range of validity of specific arguments is likely to be limited. In terms of 
the construction of models, it should be acknowledged that their relevance depends on certain 
characteristics and parameters of the economy. Growth patterns would then feature some elements 
typical of a given production structure and moment in time, variable according to economies’ 
histories and consequent changes in their structure. It seems important for these factors to be 
recognized and explicitly explored if progress is to be made towards more general propositions. 
3. Social coordination: institutions 
The study of development has particular characteristics within the field of economic analysis. 
Almost by definition, development is a non-repetitive process that, apart from its general logic and 
conditions, is marked by features of time and place. One possible analogy could be speculation 
about which organisms have good prospects of prospering and reproducing in biological evolution: 
the answer cannot be found in isolation of the environment, which is itself in flux (see Nelson and 
Winters, 1982, Nelson, 1994). Development processes also involve aspects of the social system, 
which (to simplify the analysis) economics tends to place under the heading “all else being equal”. 
This is particularly the case for institutions, which are generally assumed as given constants in the 
usual day-to-day analysis and whose influence is therefore implicitly subsumed in parameters of 
agent behaviour.  
The traditional theories of economic development (put forward by the “magnificent 
dynamics” of such classics as those of Smith or Marx, post-war pioneers such as Hirschman, 
Prebisch and Myrdal or, more recently, North) have always been concerned with the links between 
economic development and social organization. In one form or another, expanding the productive 
base was seen as part of a process of social evolution, with the corresponding changes in the 
structure of economies, group relations and interactions and political rules and arrangements. This 
evolution was not necessarily perceived as orderly or harmonious: development could be marked 
(and affected) by conflicts and tensions between social and political conditions and those that could 
make a better contribution to economic growth. In some cases, it was even argued that those very 
tensions could generate the incentives and opportunities conducive to institutional change, and to 
the development of productive activities. These changes were seen as the result of the actions of 
social groups, and of their cooperation or conflict as driven by their respective interests, beliefs and 
values, given the current situation and history of the system. Common threads running through 
these theories with their differing ideological approaches included: a vision of institutions as part of 
a system composed of interrelated elements with possible local dynamics (certain elements being 
separately modifiable, with some effect on the functioning of the whole), and the notion of 
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institutional change as a process in which economic components (in the strict sense) shift along 
with social and political elements.  
Economic development usually implies increases in the complexity of the system of 
exchanges and relations between agents, which tend to manifest themselves in higher levels of 
division of labour and greater specificity in many skills and tasks. More advanced systems (in this 
sense) therefore also have greater requirements in terms of coordinating multiple aspects of the 
behaviour of large numbers of agents. As a prerequisite for development, systems must establish 
appropriate mechanisms for coordination at different levels, such as the use of resources in 
production units, exchanges, delivery of public goods and the definition and operation of State 
machineries. These mechanisms obviously have many significant distributional implications, which 
can make them the subject of disputes and bargaining among social groups. In any event, 
coordination failures imply economic costs. Development problems (reflecting dynamics that fail to 
take advantage of existing opportunities, in the light of resources and external conditions) usually 
seem to be associated with problems in how individual decisions are made and interlinked, that is, 
institutional issues of some sort. However, it is no mean feat to identify the precise nature and 
effects of institutional limitations in concrete cases. 
Institutions, in the broad sense of the word, are clearly important for economic performance. 
This is reflected in the fact that development patterns are nearly always and unquestionably 
analysed at the national level:9 the division between economies is perceived as being naturally 
associated with the division between nations, each with its own characteristics in terms of political 
organization and patterns of social behaviour. Also, the oft-cited emblematic experiences of 
countries divided up following the Second World War point to the relevance of institutions,10 and 
cast doubt on simplistic alternative theories based solely on geographical determination or cultural 
background (see Acemoglu and others, 2004). However, theories based on the importance of 
institutions have their own simplifications. 
There is also a question mark over the basic definition of what institutions are. A useful 
starting point is the ubiquitous definition of institutions put forward by North (1990): “the rules of 
the game in a society, or, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. This 
notion clearly highlights the social character of how institutions emerge and their role as generators 
of behavioural constraints and incentives.11 Institutions also have a major role in providing 
information as a means of reducing the difficulty of decision-making for agents who, in fact, 
perform less well when confronted with complex decision-making problems. Thus, institutions act 
as a set of rules that provide structure and predictability for interactions between individuals in 
society. 
The “rules of the game” define what is being played by establishing a system of rewards and 
penalties and instilling in participants beliefs about other people’s behaviour in various 
circumstances.12 “Rule failures” bring down the quality of the game, either because they induce the 
wrong incentives, or because they complicate the formation of expectations and decision-making. 
                                                     
9  An exception would be the literature on economic geography, which emphasizes the potential clustering effects or externalities 
generated in urban areas or regions (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin and Ottaviano, 2003). 
10  In such cases, there is a sharp contrast in the performance of originally similar economies that then develop separately under different 
political regimes. However, even assessments based on how systems perform over a relatively short period of time (such as a decade) 
have observed considerable changes. During and following the United States Depression in the decade of 1930, it was widely 
considered that, in strictly economic terms, planned economies had an advantage over decentralized economies –an opinion that 
could not be further removed from subsequent viewpoints–. 
11  Another interesting vision is that of Searle (1995), who states that the creation of “institutional reality” is associated with a primitive 
logical operation along the lines of: “We accept (S has power (S does A))”. This formulation is useful for what it establishes, but also 
for what it leaves implicit, namely how the subject (“we”) is defined, how the collective acceptance of the proposition is established, 
and what is the concrete content of the acceptance or obligation. 
12  The image of the game highlights the fact that the right rules depend on the characteristics of the game itself. In the economic field, 
for example, the institutional requirements are likely to be different for an economy seeking the immediate mobilization of resources 
to exploit an opportunity provided by natural endowments, compared with those of an economy whose current development depends 
on its ability to generate and disseminate cutting-edge technological innovations. 
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The game analogy also enables us to visualize the trade-offs between lax and strict rules: total laxity 
(actions follow no pattern and injuries are common), at one extreme, versus a minutely 
predetermined ritual with no room for player initiatives or “interesting” tactics, on the other. What 
constitutes a useful compromise between predictability and flexibility might vary, and achieving it 
may be a matter of trial and error. This kind of opposition occurs in many economic contexts. The 
development potential of economies probably has more to do with their capacity to flexibly adapt to 
the environment than with efficient resource allocation (see North, 1994). An important 
characteristic of institutions would therefore be their contribution (or otherwise) to this “adaptive 
efficiency”, although there is much uncertainty about how this is generated.  
Institutions may be formally defined or may develop informally as social norms, conventions 
and codes of behaviour. The effect of institutions depends on how they operate together: certain sets 
of rules can boost, constrain or counteract other rules. In some cases, there can be complementarity 
as well as substitution and conflict between formal and informal rules (see Braverman and Stiglitz, 
1982). Differences also exist in the effectiveness and cost of mechanisms used to encourage or deter 
certain behaviours. All institutions, formal and informal, have mechanisms for implementation and 
rewards or penalties (to be applied by an agent, social group or the legal system). The responsibility 
for operating these mechanisms lies with other institutions, and so forth.13 From this point of view, 
it is possible to define a hierarchical order of institutions.14 The institutional structure is influenced 
by agents’ expectations, beliefs and perceptions (North’s “social beliefs”, 2004), and the way these 
were formed on the basis of agent experiences and learning processes.15 All of the above suggests 
that transplanting the successful rules of one society onto another would not necessarily have the 
desired effect, and uncertainty would surround the outcomes of such “institutional engineering”.  
Within the set of rules and behaviour patterns that come under the concept of economic 
institutions, emphasis has generally been placed on the definition and scope of property rights and 
their enforcement mechanisms (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; North and Thomas, 1973). The 
structure of property rights certainly affects incentives and behaviour, and ambiguities in how these 
rights are defined generate distortions and transaction costs. In terms of the growth capacity of a 
national economy, a country where individual and corporate assets may be randomly seized by a 
State authority, or where political instability gives rise to considerable variations in rights and 
obligations, will have little chance of setting up a process to accumulate capital and incorporate 
technology into production. As a prerequisite for such a process, decisions to invest in physical 
goods or generate and implement new production methods must be based on expectations of 
suitable benefits. 
However, this argument is by no means tantamount to an extreme statement linking 
development with an unbounded and unconditional perpetuation of all existing property rights. The  
 
                                                     
13  Although the issue is too complex to enter into within the present discussion, this clearly raises the question of “who will watch the 
watchers” and the possibility of circular arguments such as: laws are not respected due to failures in enforcement mechanisms, and 
this is because those in charge of enforcement follow their own interests and not those corresponding to their duties, and this is due 
to of the lack of appropriate incentives, and this is because the laws are not applied. During economic and political crises, the issue of 
the origins and the mechanisms that determine the (self)-sustainability of institutions becomes immediate and concrete: “When the 
rules for how to deal with the violation of rules come themselves to be broken, what rules will then apply?” (Leijonhufvud, 2003). 
The enforcement mechanisms for the rules and regulations that restrict the actions of those that have “public authority” are linked to 
the availability of “commitment technologies” for governments and social/political groups, which can significantly affect the 
functioning of the economy (cf. Acemoglu, 2005; Heymann, Navajas and Warnes, 1991). 
14  Acuña and Tommasi (1999) make the distinction between a basic level of rules consisting of policies (rules that potentially affect 
individual behaviour and the distribution of the results of social activity), intermediate-level rules (that determine incentives and 
constraints for modifying low-level institutions) and high-level rules.  
15  Some of these attitudes and beliefs can be part of “routine” sets of behaviour that tend to be deep-seated and resistant to change (see 
Nelson, (2002)). 
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“initial” definition of rights clearly has an effect on the potential for economic growth.16 For some 
historically determined set-ups of rights, preserving the status quo may preclude potentially 
achievable improvements, while implementing reforms would imply denying previously recognized 
property rights. The distributive issue is unavoidable. One aspect of safeguarding property rights is 
protecting the small private agent in the face of potentially arbitrary State power, but another one 
may imply “freezing” the distribution of resources in a very uneven configuration. In particular, if 
low-income groups are to benefit from relinquishing options to enact distributive measures in their 
favour, in order to promote accumulation, they would have to gain enough from growth to make it 
worth their while. In societies where poorer individuals have a significant say in policy decisions, 
the acceptability of property distribution probably depends on the concrete perception that 
maintaining the existing configuration would induce an economic expansion whose benefits would 
then be realized throughout the income scale.  
There seem to be two antipodal attitudes to institutional change. One is the “organic” 
viewpoint, according to which institutions are the outcome of the system’s unguided evolution and 
in each moment express some form of social equilibrium. In this vision, any attempt to interfere in 
the course of institutions would be useless or counterproductive. At the other extreme, the 
“constructivist” perspective holds that institutions are the products of design, and that they emerge 
and function due to acts of political will. Both versions have their problems: one denies all 
possibility of change (and ignores the fact that institutions are created and operated by agents that 
have decided to effect change and succeeded in doing so), while the other posits a capacity for 
institutional engineering that seems hard to identify in practice, and tends to trivialize social 
decision-making processes (by somehow suggesting that “where there is a will, there is a way”). 
Working out the limits of the deliberate construction of institutions is definitely complex, and 
involves considering, inter alia, the extent to which certain behavioural patterns are entrenched. 
Prior to recent reconsiderations, the last few decades have seen much of policy-based analysis 
adopt an approach close to institutional engineering, whereby countries were encouraged to 
redesign their institutions on the basis of a general predetermined pattern, either in the form of a 
decalogue or a consensus. Aside from the pros and cons of specific recommendations for concrete 
cases, the usefulness of any “list of recommended reforms” (regardless of its nature or orientation) 
is dubious since the proposals are not based on precise arguments (which is understandable, given 
the difficulty of fitting the development process into a simple set of arguments) and they claim to be 
general while ignoring the conflicts inherent in their implementation. This very lack of reference to 
conflicts and priorities is a sign of analytical weakness. 
Institution-based arguments aim to explore “ultimate” determinants of levels and variations 
of economic prosperity, in contrast with proximate determinants such as capital accumulation and 
the adoption of new technologies. At the same time, institutions are endogenously defined as the 
result of a series of “social interplays”, where the features and the evolution of the economy are 
likely to play a considerable part. That means that the relationship between development and 
institutions may not be one of direct or ultimate determination. To give the subject its due, it seems 
important to consider both the concrete way in which institutions affect the mechanisms of 
economic growth, and the fact that institutions themselves have their dynamics. Putting forward 
solid propositions would require such accurate and deep knowledge of the economic functioning 
and interactions between social and political groups as to be probably beyond reach. 
Acknowledging the qualitative gap between analytical aspirations and the capacity for establishing 
                                                     
16  For instance, highly concentrated ownership of certain resources may restrict their use and reduce investment opportunities (see 
North and Thomas, 1973), while the distribution of wealth might affect the elites’ incentives to support the diffusion of public 
education (Engermann and Sokoloff, 2000; Galiani and others, 2005). The discussion on the effects of patents as catalysts of 
technological innovation but also as a barrier to the use of existing technology also illustrates that the definition of exclusion rights 
implies far from negligible trade-offs. 
Two essays on development economics 
42 
reliable causal links may be useful for nuancing any statements and putting them in their right 
context. 
Both from an analytical and practical point of view, however, it is important to attempt to 
identify the contribution (negative or positive) of various types of institution to the capacity to 
generate economic growth. The existence of “institutional bottlenecks” would point to critical 
restrictions and lead to the identification of priorities that could be reflected in policy actions based 
on the characteristics and specific circumstances of economies (see Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 
2004). Questions also arise about complementarities or substitutions between rules, mechanisms 
and forms of organization. A complicated issue, and at the same time one that tends to emerge in 
concrete situations is the extent to which institutions make up a system in which modifying one 
component has significant effects on the whole, or whether institutions can be subject to 
incremental changes, the effects of which would be more or less independent of one another.17  
In the discussion on the endogenous nature of institutions, it has become clear that a 
country’s institutions depend on the conditions that determine the nature of social conflicts and the 
power structure that affects their outcome. Economic institutions are chosen on the basis of the 
interests of the powerful groups (Acemoglu, 2005; Mallon and Sourrouille, 1975). This puts the 
emphasis back on the structure and evolution of the economy as factors affecting various group 
interests, their economic and political influence and their incentives to either form coalitions or 
enter into conflict. Economic decisions and political attitudes also depend on expectations and 
beliefs. Structure, institutions and beliefs would thus interact in dynamics that could be subject to 
elucidation, or at least to mapping in an orderly fashion, by development analysis (see Nelson, 
1994). This clearly does not seem an easy task since, in order to generate sufficient degrees of depth 
and precision, it would require a complicated integration of quite different types of specific 
knowledge. 
4. Remarks on empirical and case studies 
The study of economic development gives rise to a variety of demands and problems for 
empirical study. One such issue concerns the chain that links a set of “ultimate causes” with 
economic outcomes. If this outcome amounts to measuring per capita GDP (as a rough 
approximation), then the accumulation of resources in the form of physical capital, skills or human 
capital, and productive knowledge, would be the main determining factors.18 However, that 
accumulation is clearly an endogenous effect of behaviour based on the perceived opportunities 
arising at a given time and place, and governed by incentives that depend on the institutional 
framework. This raises the question of how decisions regarding accumulation are made and 
implemented, which in turn relates to indirect mechanisms, leading, in principle, to “truly” 
exogenous variables operating as ultimate impulses. 
Econometrics has developed precise concepts for the notions of causality, which are 
specifically related to the estimation of structural equation systems. The parameters of a structural 
                                                     
17  To refer to one recent example in the region, the widespread opinion that the public management of enterprises generated undesirable 
incentives that were difficult to change within a State-run system led to the proposal of privatization as a “cure for all”. 
Subsequently, greater importance was given to the effect of regulatory frameworks on the functioning of privatized companies, how 
those frameworks were managed and, more generally, the effect of the legal system and the public sector’s capacity to design and 
implement standards and policies. These analytical developments made it necessary to qualify the initial propositions (which had 
often been presented unconditionally) and indirectly raised questions about whether to attribute efficiency problems in the respective 
sectors to a certain form of ownership or management, or to generic limitations in terms of public-sector capabilities, both applicable 
to direct management and to regulation. 
18  In some cases, incorporating the economic use of non-produced primary resources can represent an important factor for growth (as it 
was for Latin American countries in the nineteenth century). In such situations, there can be a period of major increases in output 
above and beyond the contribution of growth in physical capital and human skills. These processes are presumably subject to 
decreasing yields and would have different characteristics and dynamics compared with processes based on increases in capital and 
technology.  
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equation thus refer to a shifting of the estimated variable (y) in a conceptual experiment that 
involves modifying (by means of an external intervention) the value of an “explanatory” variable 
(x), all else remaining constant.19 However, experience has shown that it is difficult to identify these 
systems in the field of development economics, even assuming homogenous and stable patterns of 
behaviour among countries and over time.  
The abundant literature devoted to the identification of the causes of economic growth 
(usually based on the estimation of cross-section models) has not produced conclusive results. 
Stumbling blocks include the difficulty of formulating credible contrafactual hypotheses, and the 
size of the reference population: development processes are long-term phenomena and, therefore, 
the available set of relevant observations is not large. Given that theory does not specify strong 
restrictions on the how many potential causes to consider, the number of potentially relevant 
variables rapidly becomes comparable to the number of cases (or episodes) observed. In this regard, 
some studies have identified causes not considered important in others, thereby modifying the set of 
variables in question (see Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
More recent literature, on the other hand, has focused more on identifying causal relations in 
reduced form, although without necessarily defining “ultimate determinants”.20 Examples include 
studies that attempt to identify the causal effects of institutions (see Acemoglu and others, 2001; 
2002), thereby providing valuable information on the effects of certain causes.  
This suggests that development studies would benefit from combining the use of theoretical 
models of direct, intermediate and indirect causes with quantitative and qualitative methods aimed 
at exploring how causal processes come about in specific instances.21 Although it would not be 
possible to accurately establish causes of development (let alone identify a single final determinant), 
it does appear feasible to aim at defining certain causal links, while recognizing that they may have 
a limited range of validity.  
Heuristically, defining a starting point would require an effort to simplify the problem and to 
narrow down the set of questions to be considered. The foregoing discussion suggests that a general 
approach may not be feasible. Hence, one may conceive of an iterative process in which 
preliminary information from theories, the history of economies and existing econometric research 
can help to raise and formulate questions and outline potential chains of causality relevant to the 
case, as a way of focusing efforts. This specific basis may make it possible to posit more or less 
precisely defined questions that can be addressed with (formal or informal) modelling to identify 
empirically comparable behaviour patterns and critical parameters that would affect the validity 
ranges of hypotheses. These exercises may help to identify critical parameters that determine the 
direction and scope of economic evolution from certain initial conditions, and tend to generate 
major economic and institutional transformations (such as the emergence of significant education 
systems in Galor and Moav, 2001, 2004, and Galiani and others, 2006). This analytical support may 
guide the data analysis to be used in estimation exercises or in ordered narratives attempting to 
stylize decision-making processes, dynamics of economic performance and structural and 
institutional characteristics, which in turn might constitute the initial conditions for new analysable 
episodes. In any case, the final products will justify the methods and procedure used. 
                                                     
19  This coincides with the interpretation of Haavelmo (1943), who specifically refers to structural equations as statements on 
hypothetical controlled experiments. 
20  Another question that is important from a practical point of view is the time scale of the causal effects identified: “secular” influences 
are obviously not the same as ones that operate in the shorter term. The empirical literature under consideration has tended to 
concentrate on the former type of effect: properties of long-term evolution.  
21  An interesting reference is that of the analytic narratives (see Bates and others (1998), Rodrik (2003)).  
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